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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
E. JERRY FIVAS and ALAIRE J. \ 
FIVAS, I 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, I 
—vs.— \ No. 8470 
JOSEPH F. PETERSEN and \ 
FLORENCE E. PETERSEN, j 
Defendants and Appellants, f 
PETITION FOR REHEARING OF 
PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND 
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH: 
The plaintiffs and respondents respectfully petition 
this Court for a rehearing on its opinion issued in the 
above entitled cause on the 16th day of August, 1956. The 
petition is based upon the following grounds: 
1. The majority opinion misconstrues the plain in-
tent of Sections 59-10-9 and 10, Utah Code Annotated 
1953, by making the County an entity for the perform-
ance and responsibility of particular county officials. 
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2. The majority opinion misconstrues the appar-
ent intent of Sections 59-10-9 and 10, Utah Code Anno-
tated 1953, by demanding that the County Treasurer as-
certain the address of the taxpayer. 
3. The majority opinion makes an assumption of 
facts not supported by the record. 
The attorneys for the plaintiffs and respondents 
hereby certify that this petition for rehearing is made in 
good faith and not for the purpose of delay. 
Eespectfully submitted, 
JAMES W. BELESS, JE. 
LEWIS S. LIVINGSTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
AKGUMENT 
Our analysis of this Court's opinion dated August 
16, 1956 leads us to conclude that the majority of the 
Court has construed Sections 59-10-9 and 10, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953 by applying two separate theories to find 
the notice given to the taxpayer by the County Treasurer 
as insufficient. First, the county is determined to be an 
entity for purposes of responsibility under the taxing 
statutes, and knowledge of other county officials is 
charged to the Treasurer. Second, the legislature must 
not have meant what it said by deletions of duties of 
the Treasurer by the amendment of the statute in 1931, 
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and the duty remaining of mailing a notice to the tax-
payer at his address, "if known," is construed to mean 
"if ascertainable." 
The majority opinion clearly demonstrates the 
Court's impelling conviction that forfeitures should be 
prevented if any inequities are thereby caused. Comple-
menting the effect of the above theories of statutory con-
struction, the majority opinion finds in this situation per 
se an inequity because it involves a tax title. 
Our contentions that the Court has misconstrued 
the statutes and has misapplied facts are set forth under 
the following separate points. 
POINT I 
THE MAJORITY OPINION MISCONSTRUES THE 
PLAIN INTENT OF SECTIONS 59-10-9 AND 10 BY MAK-
ING THE COUNTY AN ENTITY FOR THE PERFORMANCE 
AND RESPONSIBILITY OF PARTICULAR COUNTY OFFI-
CIALS. 
The majority opinion construes Sections 59-10-9 and 
10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, by considering the County 
as an entity for the discharge of that portion of the tax-
ing procedure directed by statute to the County Assessor 
and Treasurer. That opinion states: 
"The recorder, by placing a deed on record, 
the assessor, by carrying the information from 
the deed to the assessment rolls, and the treasurer, 
by sending out the notices and collecting the taxes, 
are all performing duties upon which part of the 
taxing process depends. If they collectively fail 
to perform the duties to the taxpayer and the 
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public required by the statutes, that failure is 
chargeable to the county as the taxing entity." 
We submit that the practical effect of such a con-
struction of those sections would impose duties pre-
scribed solely for discharge by the Treasurer upon the 
Eecorder, Assessor, Auditor or other officials. The 
statutes are clear in giving certain named officials cer-
tain duties. We believe those duties cannot be delegated, 
without thereby violating the rule of strictissimi juris 
when such delegated acts are considered in tax title liti-
gation. We believe that knowledge in the Eecorder or 
information in his office cannot be charged to the As-
sessor or the Treasurer by the imposition of this fiction 
of "county entity." We submit that such delegation of 
duties and charging of knowledge as between county 
officials is a strained construction of the taxing statutes 
which have been written in detail purposely to pinpoint 
responsibility on certain officials and to spell out their 
duties. 
For an example, Chapter 8, Title 59, is entitled 
"County Auditor's Duties." It would be a manifest dis-
tortion of legislative intent to declare duties therein de-
fined as those of the Auditor to be performable by the 
other county officials or the "county entity." In Telonis 
v. Staley, 104 Utah 537, 144 P. 2d 513 at 517 this Court 
stated: 
"The affidavit is one of the statutory func-
tions of the county auditor and such affidavit 
must be executed and properly attached." 
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"We believe that this Court would have found an affi-
davit executed by any other county official than the 
auditor as illegal and sufficient to have voided any subse-
quent tax sale. The logical extension of the reasoning 
of this Court in the instant opinion would, in making 
the county an entity for purposes of placing responsi-
bility under the taxing statutes, condone such an irregu-
larly executed affidavit. 
The effect of the majority opinion's theory of the 
"county entity" appears to be to charge the Treasurer 
and the Assessor with knowledge of any address 
for a taxpayer as found in the office of any other county 
official; thus, an address for a taxpayer in the Record-
er's office is by this fiction known to the Treasurer or 
the Assessor within the meaning or "if known" in the 
wording of Sections 59-10-9 and 10. We believe that 
any such application of a fiction of "county entity" 
strains any possible undisclosed intent of the legislature 
beyond reason. 
We submit that the only reasonable meaning of the 
words of Section 59-10-9, "The county treasurer shall 
furnish to each taxpayer by mail to the address . . . if 
known, a notice . . ." is directed to the Treasurer and to 
him alone. We submit that the words "if known" must 
reasonably mean "if known to the Treasurer or if found 
in his office." 
POINT II 
THE MAJORITY OPINION MISCONSTRUES THE 
CLEAR INTENT OF SECTIONS 59-10-9 AND 10 BY DE-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
MANDING THAT THE COUNTY TREASURER ASCERTAIN 
THE ADDRESS OF THE TAXPAYER. 
The second effect of the majority opinion appears 
to be to construe the words "if known" in Sections 
59-10-9 and 10 to mean "if ascertainable." What degree 
of diligence shall be used by the Treasurer in his search 
for the taxpayer is left to his judgment and reason. 
We believe that any construction of Sections 59-10-9 
and 10 to retain therein a direction for the Treasurer to 
make a search outside of his office for the taxpayer 
ignores the plain fact that the legislature specifically 
deleted such duties by its amendment of the statute in 
1931. Any such construction is repulsive to the plain 
wording of the section which now directs the Treasurer 
to mail notices to the taxpayer at his address, "if known." 
The legislature by its amendment in 1931 deleted the 
affirmative duties of the Treasurer to seek out the 
taxpayer. It placed on the Treasurer the simple, prac-
tical duty of sending notices to the taxpayer at his 
address, "if known," and it gave some responsibility to 
the taxpayer, only that of keeping the treasurer's office 
advised of a current address. The majority opinion has 
read into the statute a legislative intent to retain all 
the duties of search on the Treasurer, despite their 
specific deletion, and the explanation is made that the 
amendment "was enacted during the depths of the de-
pression when taxes were hard to collect." If the intent 
was to increase the efficiency of the tax collecting pro-
cedure, certainty a shifting of some responsibility to 
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the taxpayer would have effected both a savings to the 
government of costs of search for delinquent taxpayers 
and a better collection of taxes through better contact 
with taxpayers. 
The enlightened theory of courts of sister states in 
this situation has been to place the burden on the tax-
payer and to relieve the Treasurer from any search. 
Spokane County v. Glover, 2 Wash. 2d 162, 97 P. 2d 628 
(1940); Sutter v. Scudder, 110 Mont. 390, 103 P. 2d 303 
(1940); Pender v. Ebey, 194 Okla. 407,152 P. 2d 268. 
We submit that the amendment of 1931 was purpose-
ful, clear and gave no need of interpretation of the re-
maining words "if known." I t gave some responsibility 
to the taxpayer and took a burdensome, costly duty of 
questionable degree of fulfillment from the Treasurer. 
The taxing government and honest, diligent taxpayers 
were all benefited at the expense only of the careless or 
even evasive and dishonest taxpayer, as pointed out by 
Justice Worthen in his dissenting opinion. 
We believe that the forfeiture provisions of the 
taxing statutes have a definite need. We recognize that 
there must be a choice between a possible forfeiture to 
insure the taxing government of its revenue and some 
loss to the "slothful, careless, sleeping taxpayer." How-
ever, to assure against any forfeiture and to vitiate the 
penalty provisions of the taxpaying statutes, we submit 
that a construction should not be placed on these statutes 
to strain the words "if known" to mean "if ascertainable" 
and to retain a duty of dubious fulfillment on the 
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Treasurer. We believe that such burden was purposely 
removed from the Treasurer by the deletions of the 1931 
amendment. If any latent legislative intent must be 
divined, cannot the legislature be given credit of having 
had a sensible, purposeful intent in bringing the law to 
date consistent with economy and common sense 1 
POINT III 
THE MAJORITY OPINION MAKES AN ASSUMPTION 
OF FACTS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
By a bold assumption of facts the court has deter-
mined that "plaintiffs, as purchasers of the tax title, 
would retain the benefits of an inequitable bargain in 
which they purchased the property at a price obviously 
greatly disproportionate to its value"; that this trans-
action was a "harsh bargain"; that defendants' for-
feiture would necessarily be the result of "a harsh pro-
cedure," and that this was a controversy involving for-
feiture with a "consideration relatively small in com-
parison to the value of the property." (Emphasis ours). 
The record in this matter, both before the trial court 
and on appeal, is brief and clear. Nowhere in that record 
is there any proof or showing, direct or indirect, as to 
the value of the property in question or any showing 
as to value to compare with any amounts paid by plain-
tiffs on the tax sale. In making any assumption as to the 
value of the land necessarily being greatly in excess of 
the amount paid for the tax deed by the plaintiffs this 
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Court was thereby going beyond the record or any in-
ference raised from any facts in that record. 
This court has repeatedly stated in its past decisions 
the proposition that on appeal from a judgment for the 
plaintiffs the Supreme Court is required to take all the 
evidence and every reasonable inference therefrom in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiffs. The corollary to 
this rule necessarily must be that the Supreme Court 
cannot go outside the record to determine facts or draw 
inferences against the prevailing party in the trial court 
if no facts for such finding or inferences were proved 
or shown in the lower court. Kimball Elevator Co. v. 
Elevator Supplies Co., 2 Utah 2d 289; 272 P. 2d 583 
(1954); Beck v. Jeppesen, 1 Utah 2d 127, 262 P. 2d 760 
(1953); Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 
P. 2d 927 (1953). 
The assumption of facts as made by the majority 
opinion is a prerequisite to a determination that there 
was in this situation any inequity. I t appears to us, as 
suggested by Justice Worthen in his dissenting opinion, 
that the majority of the Court is eager to avoid a "for-
feiture" and to prevent a "harsh bargain." We submit 
that any such end result should not be reached by making 
an assumption of facts not allowed by the record nor 
suggested by any facts or figures contained therein. No 
inference of value or lack of it can be drawn if there 
are no facts concerning value to infer from. 
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CONCLUSION 
The majority opinion of this Court leaves us with 
the definite impression that its author has sensed some 
inequity which must be righted by judicial inquiry neces-
sarily beyond the record and/or judicial interpretation 
of the intent of the legislature beyond the plain wording 
of the statutes. 
The majority opinion forcefully raises the question 
of whether the statutes through their clear wording, 
natural intent and meaning and over-all necessary pur-
pose should not be subordinated to the equities as sensed 
by an appellate court. We believe that this opinion places 
the personal determination of equities and the abhorance 
of forfeiture above the clear purpose of the tax sale 
procedures as firmed into statutory law by the legis-
lature. We submit that this substitution of personal 
economic and moral convictions for the written law, 
unbounded by self-restraint to do good, constitutes error 
both as to misapplication of facts and misconstruction 
of law in this instance. 
We believe that the majority opinion of this Court 
is an example of the situation as cited by Justice Black 
in his dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 
U.S. 46 (1947) where "The 'natural law' formula . . . 
has been used in the past, and can be used in the future, 
to license this Court, in considering regulatory legis- » 
lation, to roam at large in the broad expanses of policy 
and morals and to trespass, all too freely on the legis-
lative domain of the States." (cited in "Judicial Self-
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Restraint: The Obligation of the Judiciary," Am. Bar 
Jour., Vol. 42, Number 9, page 829, September, 1956.) 
We believe that serious error has been committed, 
and we ask that the Court reconsider the legal principles 
enunciated and the assumptions of facts made in the 
majority opinion and that this matter may be reheard 
by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
JAMES W. BELESS, JR. 
LEWIS S. LIVINGSTON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs and 
Respondents 
1007 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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